Economics 701: Advanced microeconomic theory, spring 2012

Instructor: Jeremy A. Sandford

Office hour: T 3-4pm 335L B&E, or by appointment
Lecture: 1pm-1:50pm MWF, BE 214

Midterm dates: Friday, February 17, 1-4pm, Friday, March 30, 1-4pm
Final date: Monday, April 30, 8am-10am

Required text: Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press

Homework 1, answers
Homework 2, answers
Homework 3, answers
Homework 4, answers
Homework 5, answers
Homework 6, answers
Homework 7, answers

Here are some answers to my prelim questions.

Schedule

Wednesday, January 11: Game theory in context
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 7

Friday, January 13: Describing normal and extensive form games, mixed strategies
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 7

Monday, January 16: No class (MLK Day)
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 7

Wednesday, January 18: Describing extensive form games. Mixed and behavior strategies.
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 7

Friday, January 20: Mixed and behavior strategies, reduced normal form games
readings: Mas-Colell, chapters 7-8

Monday, January 23: Solving normal form games: dominant and dominated strategies
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 8

Wednesday, January 25: Solving normal form games: iterated removal of dominated strategies, rationalizability
(weakly) dominant strategies in action
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 8

Friday, January 27: Solving normal form games: rationalizability, using simplices in 3x3 games
readings: Mas-Colell, chapters 8

Monday, January 30: Solving normal form games: Nash equilibrium
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 8

Wednesday, February 2: Nash equilibrium, interpretations of Nash equilibrium
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 8

Friday, February 4: interpreting Nash equilibrium, trembling hand refinement
readings: Mas-Colell, chapter 8

Monday, February 6: no class

Wednesday, February 8: subgame perfect refinement, backward induction
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Friday, February 10: subgame perfect refinement, backward induction
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Monday, February 13: subgame perfect refinement, backward induction (Rubinstein bargaining model, chapter 9 appendix)
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Wednesday, February 15: subgame perfect refinement, backward induction
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Friday, February 17: Midterm 1, answers

Monday, February 20: Perfect Bayesian refinement
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Wednesday, February 22: Perfect Bayesian refinement
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Friday, February 24: Perfect Bayesian refinement, sequential equilibrium
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 9

Monday, February 27: repeated game strategies
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12.D, 12.AA

Wednesday, February 29: repeated games: Nash reversion
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12.D, 12.AA

Friday, March 2: repeated games: minmax payoffs, carrot and stick strategies
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12.D, 12.AA

Monday, March 5: no class

Wednesday, March 7: minmax theorem, example of carrot and stick strategy
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12.D, 12.AA

Friday, March 9: Monopoly
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12

Monday, March 12-Friday March 16: No class (spring break)

Monday, March 19: Cournot oligopoly
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12

Wednesday, March 21: Stackelberg oligopoly model
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12

Friday, March 23: Loose ends with Cournot and Stackelberg models
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 12

Monday, March 26: Education as a labor market signal
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 13
Spence, M. 1973, "Job market signaling", QJE, 87, pp. 355-374

Wednesday, March 28: PBE review

Friday, March 30: Midterm 2, answers

Monday, April 2: Education as a labor market signal
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 13
Spence, M. 1973, "Job market signaling", QJE, 87, pp. 355-374

Wednesday, April 4: Education as a labor market signal
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 13
Spence, M. 1973, "Job market signaling", QJE, 87, pp. 355-374

Friday, April 6: Adverse selection
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 13
Akerlof, G. 1970, "The Market for Lemons", QJE, 84, pp. 488-500

Monday, April 9: Adverse selection in a labor market setting
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 13

Wednesday, April 11: Statistical discrimination and pervasive discrimination
reading: Coate, S. and G. Loury (1993), "Will affirmative-action policies eliminate negative stereotypes?" AER, 83, pp. 1220-1240

Friday, April 13: Coate and Loury equilibria, numerical example
reading: Coate, S. and G. Loury (1993), "Will affirmative-action policies eliminate negative stereotypes?" AER, 83, pp. 1220-1240

Monday, April 16: Affirmative action in Coate and Loury
reading: Coate, S. and G. Loury (1993), "Will affirmative-action policies eliminate negative stereotypes?" AER, 83, pp. 1220-1240

Wednesday, April 18: two part tarriffs and screening models

Friday, April 20: No class

Monday, April 23: numerical example of two-part tarriffs and screening models
reading: Notes on second-degree price discrimination

Wednesday, April 25: Principal-agent models, moral hazard
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 14.B

Friday, April 27: Principal-agent models, moral hazard
reading: Mas-Colell, chapter 14.B

Monday, April 30, 9am-12n: Final exam, answers